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The paper estimates how parents adjust bride-prices and land divisions to compensate their 
sons for differences in their schooling investments in rural China. The main estimate implies 
that when a son receives one yuan less in schooling investment than his brother, he will  
obtain 0.7 yuan more in observable marital and post-marital transfers as partial 
compensation. Controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity, planned consumption 
differences across sons, and a fuller accounting of lifetime transfers are quantitatively 
important. The empirical findings strongly support the unitary model as a model of resource 
allocation for sons in traditional agricultural families. 
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Parents have to decide how much to invest and the types of investment to make in each of
their children. As summarized in his 1991 book, Becker argues that parents should ￿rst choose
investments in their children to maximize total household wealth, and then use intra-household
transfers to distribute consumption among their children to maximize parental utility. Family
members￿consumption levels are independent of their income contributions to the family wealth.
The above model is known as the unitary or wealth maximization model of the family. There
are three classes of tests of the model based on the above two predictions. One class is the income
pooling test (e.g., Thomas (1990); Altonji et. al. (1992); Lundberg et. al. (1997); Du￿ o (2003);
Bobonis (2009)). If family member i gains a dollar of exogenous own income while member j loses
a dollar of exogenous own income, there should be no change in i￿ s or j￿ s consumption because total
family wealth remains the same. This literature generally ￿nds that the distribution of income is a
crucial determinant of the distribution of consumption among the family members, contradicting
the unitary model.
The second class is the income di⁄erence transfer test (e.g., Menchik (1980, 1988); Cox (1987);
Cox and Rank (1992); Altonji et. al. (1997); Raut and Tran (2005)). If family member i gains
a dollar of exogenous own income and member j loses a dollar of exogenous own income, i will
receive one dollar less in intra-household transfers and j will receive one dollar more in transfers;
hence every family member￿ s consumption remains the same. Empirical results of this literature
are mixed.1
A third class of test is based on the hypothesis that families invest to maximize household
wealth. E¢ ciency in investments requires more resources to be directed towards family members
with higher marginal return or lower marginal cost, which serves as a testable implication in this
literature (e.g., Pitt et. al.(1990); Udry (1996); Qian (2008)). The results are mixed.2
The choice of which test to use is primarily driven by data availability. Many, if not most,
traditional agricultural societies are patrilocal. Sons either live with their parents or stay in the same
village after they marry. Parents and adult sons often farm and conduct other business together.
Thus, there are closer interactions between parents and adult sons than observed in modern urban
environments. Allocation decisions within rural households are more likely to be made consistently
with the unitary model. However, tests of the unitary model among these rural societies are
1Based on US bequests data, Menchik (1980, 1988) argues that there are no compensating transfers within most
families. Using pension and household survey data for the US, Cox (1987), Cox and Rank (1992) ￿nd that transfers are
reinforcing rather than compensatory. Using the PSID data, Altonji et. al. (1997) estimate a marginal compensation
e⁄ect of 0.13, which is very small. Using data from Indonesia, Raut and Tran (2005) estimate the same speci￿cation
as Altonji et. al. (1997), but with data on transfers from children to parents. They ￿nd a compensation e⁄ect of
0.95, which is much higher than estimates with US data.
2Pitt et. al. (1990) found that food consumption within Indian rural families were positively correlated with
calories expended in labor supply. Udry￿ s (1996) study of African rural households reveals that, within the same
household, plots controlled by women have signi￿cantly higher marginal productivity of capital and labor input than
the plots controlled by men, indicating that production inputs are not e¢ cient among these households. Comparing
across di⁄erent regions of China, Qian (2008) found that daughters had higher survival rates when their adult wages
are higher. She also found that daughters and sons both had more education when the female adult wage is higher.
The former result is consistent with the unitary model, while the latter is not.
1limited because when household incomes are jointly earned, data on the income contribution of each
adult household member is usually unavailable.3 In addition, ￿nancial transfers among household
members, normally identi￿ed by the di⁄erence between individual speci￿c consumption and income,
are also hard to measure. To get around the measurement problems, some studies use policy or
geographic variations to proxy for individual-speci￿c income changes;4 other studies ignore the
co-resident sample.5
This paper provides a new test of the unitary model for traditional rural households called
the investment di⁄erence transfer test. It is based on studying how parental transfers adjust to
compensate for di⁄erences in parental investments. We apply our test using a unique household
survey dataset from rural China, where patrilocality is a common practice: 38 percent of the sons
live with their parents, and 64 percent live in the same village with their parents after marriage.
To test the unitary model in this environment, we study the relationship between a signi￿cant
investment, educational expenditure, and two inter-vivos transfers made by Chinese villagers to
their sons: marital transfers (bride-price), and post-marital land divisions. As suggested by our
interviews with parents, and also con￿rmed by our data, educational expenditures are the largest
component of monetary parental investment. Bride-prices plus land divisions are typically the
largest transfers from parents to sons. In this sense, they are closer to the lifetime inter-vivos
transfer in Becker￿ s model.6
We present a unitary model to guide our regression speci￿cations and interpret the empirical
results. The model delivers a regression of a measure of parental transfers on schooling expenditure
for each child in the household, controlling for household and sibling ￿xed e⁄ects in a multiplicative
form. The regression provides a causal estimate of how parents adjust a particular transfer to
their children in response to di⁄erences in schooling expenditures on these children. We call this
regression coe¢ cient the marginal compensation coe¢ cient. In the standard unitary model, this
coe¢ cient should identify the marginal gross return (payo⁄) to a child￿ s schooling expenditure, r,
which should be larger than 1.0. However, when a rural family invests in a child, a portion of
the gross return to the investment may accrue to the family rather than to the child directly. If
a child directly appropriates a fraction f of the gross returns from his investment, the marginal
compensation coe¢ cient estimates f ￿ r. When f < 1, the 1.0 benchmark is suggestive but not
compelling.
The main empirical ￿nding of our paper is that our point estimate of the marginal compensa-
tion coe¢ cient for di⁄erences in schooling expenditures across sons is 0.7. The estimate implies
that when a son receives one yuan less in schooling investment than his brother, he will obtain
0.7 yuan more in transfers that are observed by us as partial compensation. This point estimate
3Udry (1996) is an exception.
4For example, Qian (2008) uses inter-regional variation in tea production as a proxy for female wages. Bobonis
(2009) uses a child care subsidy program to proxy for an increase in wife￿ s income and rain shocks to proxy for the
variations in jointly-held income by the couple.
5E.g., Raut and Tran (2005), Altonji et. al. (1992,1997). Kaplan (2009) shows that moving back to the parents￿
home is important for poor families in the United States.
6While we use the term bride-price for convenience, most if not all the transfer is given to the son to help him
set up his new household. It is not a transfer payment to the bride￿ s family.
2is signi￿cantly larger than previous estimates of compensating parental transfers for di⁄erences in
intra-household investments in children. In the farming households considered here, full appropri-
ation of the returns to schooling expenditure (f = 1) is not appropriate. Thus the evidence here
provides signi￿cant support for the unitary model for the communities in our study.
Four factors are important in obtaining our point estimate. First, it is quantitatively important
to control for unobserved household heterogeneity. Due to data limitations, most researchers cannot
control for household unobservables.7 In the context of the income di⁄erence transfer test, if
children from richer families receive more in parental investments and have higher own incomes,
failing to control for household unobservables will result in a substantial underestimate of the
parental compensation response. Our results con￿rm the downward biases in the OLS regressions:
the estimated marginal compensation coe¢ cient increases by a third in absolute value when we
control for unobserved household heterogeneity.
Second, fuller accounting for lifetime transfers matters. Becker￿ s model is static. Most empirical
work, including ours, tests the model using partial lifetime transfers and partial lifetime income
observed over a window of only a few years.8;9 We show that using partial lifetime transfers to carry
out our test leads to a systematic bias in our estimate of the marginal compensation coe¢ cient.
The extent of the bias can be tested with multiple transfers and we do so here. The household
￿xed e⁄ects regression of marital transfers on schooling expenditure delivers an estimated marginal
compensation coe¢ cient of 0.4. By adding post-marital land transfers to the bride price, we increase
the value of the estimated compensation coe¢ cient to 0.7.
Third, controlling for other observed sibling di⁄erences in allocated consumption does not
change the estimated homogenous marginal compensation coe¢ cient. Most studies based on sibling
variation assume ￿equal concern￿ , i.e., parents put equal weights on the consumption of their chil-
dren in the utility function. Some previous rejections of the unitary model may be due to "unequal
concern" rather than non-unitary behavior. Our empirical results show that parents do not equalize
consumption across children. We further relax the homogenous marginal compensation coe¢ cient
assumption and ￿nd that children￿ s attributes a⁄ect the magnitude of the marginal compensation
coe¢ cients as predicted by the theoretical model, but these e⁄ects are not precisely estimated.
Lastly, the optimal transfer to a child may be negative and infeasible because the child refuses to
cooperate. In these cases, optimal parental investments are more complicated because the two-step
optimization breaks down (Behrman et. al. (1995)).10 When negative transfers are infeasible, tests
7An exception is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data used by McGarry and Schoeni (1995). They found
in their ￿xed e⁄ect regression that parental transfers are larger to children in the low income categories. It is hard to
compare their study to the aforementioned tests, as they include both income and schooling of the children in their
regressions.
8The President￿ s Commission on Pension Policy (PCPP) survey used by Cox (1987) reports transfers received by
children in 1979. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data used by Altonji et. al. (1997) include transfers
of more than 100 dollars in 1988. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data used in McGarry and Schoeni (1995)
reports transfers of 500 dollars or more made to each child over the past two years.
9Altonji et. al. (1997) show that, with credit constraints, using partial lifetime transfers may be valid.
10Two-step optimization may also fail when the marginal utlities of consumption and labor supply are not separable
in the household utility function (Pitt et. al. (1990)).
3using data with only positive transfers may su⁄er from selection bias.11 Our current framework does
not deal with corner solutions in our measure of parental transfers where the two-step optimization
fails. But this problem is not quantitatively signi￿cant in our context because nearly all of the sons
receive strictly positive bride-prices.12
We check the robustness of our results along several other dimensions. Accounting for measure-
ment error in schooling expenditure, discounting of the timing of school expenditures and bride
prices, or accounting for the public goods￿components in children￿ s consumption do not increase
the estimate of the compensation coe¢ cient.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on intra-household resource allocation in rural
China where 60 percent of the population in China still lives. Using a dataset of monozygotic
twins, Li et. al. (2008) ￿nd that urban parents provide more marital gifts to children who su⁄ered
from involuntary rustication during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). They also study within
gender di⁄erences. Qian (2008) found mixed support for the unitary model when she studied gender
di⁄erences in parental investments. Thus these studies, including ours, suggest that the unitary
model of parental resource allocation applies within gender in rural China. Its application across
gender is less clear.13
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of parental investment, derives
testable implications, and discusses identi￿cation issues. Section 3 introduces the data and de-
scriptive results. Section 4 reports the estimation results. Section 5 addresses some related issues.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A Unitary Model of Parental Investment
Consider a household h with two of their children, denoted by i = 1;2 respectively. The parents
have a wealth endowment of mh. Child i has ability level aih. The parents decide how to allocate
family resources to its members.
Let the parents￿utility function be
Uh = u(ch;c1h;c2h) (1)
where u(￿) is a twice di⁄erentiable, concave function; ch represents the consumption of the parents;
cih is child i￿ s consumption.14 A family may have more than two children; the consumption of the
11Cox (1987); Altonji et. al. (1997); Raut and Tran (2005) correct for selection in their empirical work.
12It is an issue with dowries for daughters where one-third of the households provide no dowry to at least one
daughter.
13Our paper does not address gender di⁄erences. The gender di⁄erence patterns in our data are similar with
other developing counties (e.g. villages examined by Quisumbing￿ s (1994) in Philippines): girls receive comparable
schooling investments with their brothers, but they generally receive signi￿cantly less dowry and nearly no bequests.
14As later on we will use the marital transfer as a measure of inter-vivos transfers, we might think of incorporating
the marital market clearing conditions into our framework. This can be easily done by assuming positive assortative
matching among spouses. Imagine that parents care not only about the consumption level of their own children,
but also about the consumption of to whom they are married. For example, we can consider a family h thinking of




2h so that they
4other children in the household is subsumed in parental consumption.
Parents can invest in their children￿ s schooling. Let the parents spend sih on child i￿ s schooling.
This expenditure generates R(sih;a1h;a2h;mh) revenue from i￿ s schooling for the family. R(:) may
be labor earnings if the child works outside the home. In rural households, R(:) is the contribution
of the child to family income. We expect R(:) to be increasing in its arguments. The total cost of
sih to the family is C(sih;a1h;a2h;mh). The cost function C(￿) contains both the monetary and
time cost to the family associated with each yuan spent on schooling.
The budget constraint of the family is





where wh denotes the total family wealth available for consumption.
To maximize utility, schooling investments should be chosen to maximize total family wealth.







determines the optimal schooling investment level s￿
ih(a1h;a2h;mh) of child i. The two schooling
decisions will determine optimal family wealth w￿
h(s1h;s2h;a1h;a2h;mh).
We now solve for the optimal consumption allocations. Following Becker, we employ a homo-
thetic utility function u(￿). A convenient property of homotheticity is that the expenditure on each
consumption good will be a ￿xed proportion of total wealth. In our context, the utility maximizing








h = (1 ￿ k1h ￿ k2h)w￿
h (5)
where kih denotes the proportion of total family wealth allocated to child i.15 We do not interpret
can attract brides with expected consumption levels of b c
b
1h and b c
b
2h respectively. Here we use superscript g and b to









This equation, however, can be simpli￿ed to equation (1) through positive assortative matching in the marriage
market. To illustrate this point, assume that the matching function takes the form c
b
ih = ￿0 + ￿1c
g
ih + ￿ih, where
i = 1;2 and ￿ih is the deviation (with zero mean) from positive assortative matching in wealth due to love and


























2h) which is the utility function (1) we use in the model.
15kih represents the weight parents put on child i￿ s consumption level in their utility function. To illustrate






2h , then k1h =























5kih as parental preference parameters. Di⁄erent values of kih serve as a convenient form to capture
alternative concerns as to why di⁄erent children may have di⁄erent levels of consumption. Parents
may give more consumption to their older sons not because they "like" them more than their other
sons, but because the older sons are more likely to live with them after marriage and provide them
elder support. Such dynamic concerns from the parents are embedded in our model through kih.
Becker refers to the case where k1h = k2h as equal concerns. In our context, equal concerns has no
normative implication.
The parents can a⁄ect child i￿ s consumption through two channels: revenue from schooling
investment for the whole family, R￿







In rural households, R(s￿
ih;a1h;a2h;mh) may include family income that is jointly earned. Thus,
not all of it may be appropriated by the child. fih 2 [0;1] is the proportion of R(s￿
ih;a1h;a2h;mh)
retained by the child for his own consumption.16 Substituting in the optimal consumption and





So far, we have characterized the parental investment behavior under a framework that allows
heterogeneity in both parents and children￿ s attributes, and unequal parental valuations of their
investments across children. The model presented here is a unitary model that nests all tests
proposed in the literature. The choice of tests crucially depends on data availability.17
In our speci￿c context, as in most developing countries, individual income (fR) is not well
de￿ned and hard to measure. Instead, we observe parental investments (s) and transfers (t). In
this case, what we can learn from the data is the compensation/substitution relationship between
s and t based on equation (6). We will develop a new test using this relationship to examine the
￿tness of the unitary model to the data.
2.1 Empirical speci￿cation
To turn (6) into a regression equation of transfers on schooling expenditure, consider a constant-
















16Parents and other family members obtain (1 ￿ fih)R
￿
ih.
17With proxies for marginal returns (Rs) and investment data (s) as in Qian (2008), one can test the model using
the ￿rst order condition (2) and see if members with higher prospective returns receive more in investments; with
income (fR) and consumption data (c), as in Lundberg et. al. (1997), one can use consumption decision equations
(3) and (4) and see if family members￿consumption remains the same with a shift in income between family members;
with income (fR) and transfer data (t) as in Altonji et. al. (1997), one can test the model using equation (6) and
see if, holding family wealth (wh) constant, a dollar increase in income decreases transfers received by one dollar (so





where eih is an IID random shock with cov(s￿
ih;e￿
ih) = 0 and rih is the marginal rate of return
to schooling expenditure. For empirical tractability, we assume that other siblings￿attributes ajh
(j 6= i) and parental wealth mh only a⁄ect child i￿ s schooling return function R through his optimal
schooling investment s￿
ih.




ih ￿ fiheih (7)
We call fihrih the marginal compensation coe¢ cient. It measures the marginal e⁄ect of a child￿ s
schooling expenditure on his parental transfer.
The distinction between rih and fihrih deserves attention. The former is the marginal return at
the household level, while the latter is at the individual level. (1￿fih)rih captures the externalities
that other family members bene￿t from the schooling investment in child i. In our context, parents
are the decision makers. When making schooling investment decisions, they only care about the
e¢ ciency at the household level. In other words, they will choose s￿







Given a random sample of households h = 1;::;H, consider the regression
tih = ￿ihFh + ￿ihsih + "ih (8)
where fFhgH
h=1 are household ￿xed e⁄ects capturing household wealth, ￿ih are sibling ￿xed e⁄ects,
and ￿ih are the child-speci￿c coe¢ cients on schooling expenditure. The estimation and interpreta-
tion of ￿ih and ￿ih warrant detailed discussions.
2.1.1 Sibling ￿xed e⁄ects ￿ih
First, unlike the usual speci￿cation in the literature, in equation (8), inter-vivos transfers are
linear in schooling expenditure but multiplicative in household and sibling ￿xed e⁄ects.
Second, ￿ih is child dependent. Empirically, we allow ￿ih to depend on a set of binary indicators:
whether (1) the son is taller than his sibling, (2) has more years of agricultural experience at the
time of his marriage, (3) has more years of non-agricultural experience, (4) lived outside the home
before marriage, (5) live with the parents after marriage, and (6) he is the ￿rst son.
We now discuss the normalization of ￿ih. To ease exposition, let son i in household h be
characterized by two indicator variables Dih = (Da
ih;Db
ih) 2 f0;1g ￿ f1;0g. Let the sons with
(Da
ih;Db
ih) = (0;0) be the base group denoted by ￿0. Not all households have a son where ￿ih = ￿0.
18While beyond the scope of this paper, the divergence between household and individual optimality creates
intra-household con￿ ict outside the unitary framework.





= (1 + ￿aDa
ih + ￿bDb
ih) ￿ !h (9)
where !h estimates k0w￿
h, which is the consumption level enjoyed by a child with hypothetical
characteristics ￿0 in household h. ￿a or ￿b is the increase in kih due to the presence of characteristic
a or b for child i relative to the hypothetical child 0 within household h.
2.1.2 Marginal compensation for di⁄erences in schooling investment
￿￿ih in equation (8) estimates fihrih, the marginal compensation coe¢ cient in equation (7).
Because of the multiplicative form between fih and rih, we cannot identify them separately without
imposing further assumptions.
Proposition 1 (Homogenous marginal compensation ) If (1) the marginal return to school-
ing investments is homogenous across children and families (rih = r), and (2) the appropriation
coe¢ cient is also homogenous across children and families (fih = f), then ￿￿ih = ￿￿ in equation
(8) identi￿es the marginal compensation coe¢ cient, i.e., ￿plim b ￿ = f ￿ r ￿ r.
First, the above proposition is true even if we cannot observe abilities of the children. When
the gross return to educational investments is homogenous, abilities a⁄ect the level of investments
only through the marginal cost of schooling. Variations in sih capture all variations in unobservable
aih. Therefore cov(sih;"ih) = 0 holds in equation (8).
Second, the marginal bene￿t of schooling investments should be equalized with marginal cost
at the optimum. The marginal cost of schooling will be larger than one with a positive interest rate
and if there are non-pecuniary costs to schooling. Then if we observe positive schooling expenditure,
the marginal bene￿t (r) must be greater than or equal to one as well. Proposition 1 says that ￿￿
estimates f ￿ r ￿ r. The standard version of the income di⁄erence transfer test of Becker￿ s unitary
model tests whether ￿￿ > 1, which is only valid if there is full appropriation, f = 1. Otherwise,
there is no reason to expect ￿￿ > 1.
Even if we are willing to accept that ￿￿ estimates f ￿ r, there are other empirical issues.
Proposition 2 (Regression without ￿xed e⁄ects) Suppose that fihrih = f ￿ r. A regression
without household ￿xed e⁄ects will deliver ￿plim b ￿ < f ￿ r.
If we work with a dataset without sibling variation in the same household, a household ￿xed
e⁄ects￿regression is infeasible. In this case, we are estimating the equation
tih = ￿ + ￿sih + ￿ih (10)
= kihwh ￿ f ￿ rsih + kihwh ￿ kihwh + "ih (11)
8where kihwh = (
H P
h=1
(k1h +k2h)wh)(2H)￿1. Since cov(sih;wh) > 0 and cov(sih;kih) > 0, ￿plim b ￿ =
f ￿ r ￿
Cov(sih;kihwh)
V ar(sih) < f ￿ r. The result is intuitive. Richer families tend to invest more in both
schooling and marital transfers, therefore a regression with imperfect controls for family wealth or
￿xed e⁄ects will bias the estimates of f ￿ r downwards. However, controlling for household e⁄ects
itself is not enough. The importance of sibling e⁄ects is emphasized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Unobservable preference bias controls) Suppose that fihrih = f ￿ r, and
cov(kih;aih) > 0. Controlling for household ￿xed e⁄ects while ignoring the sibling ￿xed e⁄ects
kih will bias the estimates of f ￿ r downwards, i.e., ￿plim b ￿ < f ￿ r.
When kih is determined by children￿ s ability, which we do not observe in our data, we are not
able to control for kih at all. The transfers equation becomes
tih = kwh ￿ f ￿ rsih + (kih ￿ k)wh
Even though kwh is picked up with the household ￿xed e⁄ect, (kih ￿ k)wh will be treated as
part of the error term. Given that cov(f sih;wh) > 0 and cov(kih;sih) > 0, ￿plim b ￿ = f ￿ r ￿
Cov(f sih;(kih￿k)wh)
V ar(f sih) < f ￿ r, where f sih is the deviation of schooling investments from the household
mean.
With the "equal concern" assumption, kih = k, hence ￿plim b ￿ = f ￿ r. The bias discussed
here is relevant when parental "unequal concern" towards children is quantitatively signi￿cant and
"unequal concern" is unobserved.
Proposition 4 (Heterogenous marginal compensation) If fih = f but rih = r+ a"a
ih, where
"a
ih = aih ￿ E(aih) and  a > 0, then ￿plim b ￿ > f ￿ r.
When the return to schooling is positively correlated with children￿ s unobserved abilities, we
are estimating the equation
tih = kihwh ￿ f ￿ rsih + ￿ih
= kihwh ￿ f ￿ rsih ￿ f ￿  a"a
ihsih ￿ eih
If Cov(sih;￿ a"a
ihsih) < 0, ￿ in equation (8) will be biased downwards. In other words, the average
marginal compensation coe¢ cient f ￿ r will be over-estimated.
To test if the coe¢ cient on the schooling expenditure f ￿ r is child speci￿c, we consider the
following regression:
tih = (1 + ￿Dih)!h + ￿sih + ￿Dihsih + "ih (12)
where we interact schooling investments with children observables (Dih). The sign of ￿ will tell
us if children with certain attributes tend to receive higher or lower marginal compensation for
di⁄erences in schooling investments (fihrih).
9To sum up, the full speci￿cation that we estimate, without restricting fihrih = f ￿r, is equation
(12). The parameters (￿;!;￿;￿) will be estimated through non-linear least squares. In the appen-
dix, we discuss in detail the estimation algorithm and econometric issues including the incidental
parameters problem.
2.2 Investment di⁄erence multiple transfers test
All existing tests of the unitary model that are based on income-transfer di⁄erences su⁄er from
a common measurement issue: researchers only observe a part of the total inter-vivos transfers that
are made by parents over their children￿ s lifetime.
Proposition 5 (Partially observable inter-vivos transfer) Suppose we observe t
0
ih = ￿tih +
￿ih, with 0 < ￿ < 1, IID ￿ih s N(0;￿2
￿) and cov(tih;￿ih) = 0. Let fihrih = f ￿ r. Then
￿plimb ￿ = ￿f ￿ r < f ￿ r.
This proposition illustrates a useful case: If the observed transfers are proportional to the real
total value, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on schooling will be proportional to f ￿ r.
We use the above proposition to derive an investment di⁄erence multiple transfers test. If we
increase ￿ by adding more transfers to the dependent variable, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient
on schooling should increase and converge towards the true value of the marginal compensation
coe¢ cient. Formally, let the researcher observe two transfers: tih;1 and tih;2. We can sum these two
transfers to get a more complete measure of lifetime parental transfer, denoted as tih;3. Note that
tih;g = ￿gkihwh ￿ ￿gf ￿ rsih + ￿g"ih + ￿ih;g (13)
where g = 1;2;3 and ￿3 = ￿1 + ￿2. When Cov(sih;"ih) = 0,
￿plimc ￿ti < ￿plimc ￿t3 = (￿1 + ￿2)f ￿ r (14)
where i = 1;2, and c ￿tg denotes the estimated ￿ when the transfer at time g is the dependent




> 1, g = 1;2 (15)
as the investment di⁄erence multiple transfers test of the unitary model.
One nice feature of this test is that the result is independent of the other concerns a⁄ecting
the consistency of our estimate of ￿￿. In (13), since Cov(tih;g;￿ih;g) = Cov(sih;￿ih;g) = 0 by
construction, the potential bias associated with ￿￿tg in each transfer regression only comes from
the possible correlation between sih and "ih, which is invariant across transfers. Denoting this bias
term as  , then ￿plimc ￿tg = ￿g(f ￿r￿ ). The bias term   may change the signs of the coe¢ cients
in di⁄erent transfer regressions, but it will not a⁄ect their ratios. Speci￿cally, when   < f ￿ r, ￿
should always be negative and adding more transfers to the dependent variable should decrease the
10coe¢ cient on schooling investments towards ￿f ￿r (increasing its magnitude). Readers are referred
to appendix C for a concrete example of   and formal derivation of the above arguments.
Since testing hypothesis (15) involves comparing coe¢ cients across di⁄erent regressions (with
di⁄erent dependent variables), we employ the bootstrap method to obtain con￿dence bounds for
our test statistics.
3 Data
The data used in this study come from the "Survey on Family and Marriage Dynamics in Hebei
Province", which was carried out in rural Hebei in the summer of 2005 by the authors and their
Chinese colleagues. Rural Hebei province is culturally, economically, and socially representative
of North China. Altogether, 600 households from 30 villages, in 15 townships in 3 counties were
surveyed.19 Figure 1 locates each of the counties in Hebei.
The survey was designed to address some of the issues discussed in the previous section. Each
household was required to have at least one married child in order to be included in the sample.
Our respondents are parents in the household between the ages of 50 to 69. We exclude parents
older than 70 because of concerns about recall.
For each child, information on signi￿cant events over his/her life was collected from the parents,
including (1) education, (2) pre-marital work experience, (3) engagement and marriage, (4) fertility
and post-marriage intra-family arrangements and (5) pre-mortem household division if applicable.
To minimize the burden of the interview, for households with more than three married children,
three of them were selected.20 In total, our survey covers 600 households with 1688 children (853
sons and 830 daughters) in total, among which 1276 (628 sons and 648 daughters) have been
married. In the following parts of this section, we discuss the key variables used in this study and
the construction of our working sample.
3.1 Education Expenditure
In rural Hebei, parents shoulder almost all of the educational costs of their children. Self-
￿nancing by children is negligible. For each child in our dataset, we collected data on educational
expenditure since middle school (grade 7), including tuition fees, books, and room and board, all
de￿ ated to 1980 price levels. We do not have expenditure data for elementary school, because
most parents could not accurately recall such information. Instead, we impute the spending on
19The three counties, Feng Run, Zhao Xian, and Chi Cheng, were selected after extensive analysis of county and
township-level economic and demographic information from the 1980s and 1990s. Feng Run is the richest of the three
in terms of per capita GDP, and Chi Cheng is the poorest. Within each county, townships were ranked on the basis
of incomes, and then one was randomly selected from each quintile. Two villages were then randomly selected in each
township, one for the upper half of the income distribution, and one from the lower half. Finally, from each village,
20 households satisfying age requirements for the household head and his spouse were randomly selected.
20The selection criteria were: (1) Choose the children who married ￿rst and last; (2) If the two selected children
are of the same sex, choose a third of the opposite sex; (3) If the two selected children are of the opposite sex, choose
a third one about whom the parents were most worried when s/he was 15; (4) If none of these criterion are applicable,
daughters are preferred.
11elementary school for each child. A recent study by Liu et. al. (2006) shows that the total cost of
elementary education is about half the cost of middle school education in rural China. In light of
this, we regress observed middle school expenses on gender, cohort and village dummies, and halve
the predicted value before using it as imputed elementary schooling expenditure.21
Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of educational expenditures in our sample. Total educational
expenditure on sons in 1980 yuan increased signi￿cantly along with household annual income fol-
lowing economic reform. These expenditures rose especially fast early on, but the increase slowed
beginning in the late 1980s. Total household expenditure on a son￿ s education amounts to about
four-￿fths of annual household income. Increases in educational expenditures arose mainly from an
increase in years of schooling, rather than increases in annual costs (Refer to ￿gure A1).22
3.2 Marital Transfers
The ￿rst signi￿cant inter-vivos transfer in our dataset is marital transfers. Currently, a large
part of the marital transfers in rural Hebei is given by parents to their marrying children, and
not to their in-laws. It is an inter-generational transfer rather than an inter-familial transfer. At
the time of the marriage, both the groom￿ s and the bride￿ s families provide furniture, major home
appliances, farm equipment, and sometimes cash payments to the newly-wed couple.23 The groom￿ s
family usually spends more because traditionally the groom is responsible for building a new house
for the newly weds. In our dataset, for each marriage, we have a complete inventory of marital
transfers along with their monetary value.
Parents must save for years in order to ￿nance these expenditures. Escalating marital expenses
in Chinese villages during the past two decades have been well documented in the literature (E.g.
Siu (1993); Min and Eades (1995); Zhang (2000)). Our dataset con￿rms high and rising marital
transfers, especially in bride-prices, since the economic reform. Refer to Figure 2. Despite some
￿ uctuations in the early 1990s and 2000s, the bride-price is roughly two and a half times annual
household income. With reported rural household savings running about thirty percent of reported
household income,24 it takes parents 7 to 8 years to accumulate the bride-price. By contrast, the
dowry is normally equal to about half of annual household income.
In this paper, we focus on parental transfers toward sons. This sample restriction is based on
several concerns. First, nearly all sons receive strictly positive marital transfers. When both sons
receive positive transfers, transfer decisions re￿ ect interior solutions to the parents￿optimization
21The mean of this imputed variable is around 300 yuan.
22We also examine educational expenditures on daughters over the same period. In the 1980s, spending on girls￿
education was below that on boys, but by the mid-1990s investments in children￿ s human capital are about the same
between genders.
23Actually, the cash transfer paid by the groom￿ s family, which accounts for about 20 percent of the bride price,
is usually given directly to the bride￿ s family. However, once the bride￿ s parents receive this cash payment, they can
either keep it or use it to purchase items for the dowry. The dowry ￿nanced by the cash component of the bride-price
is often referred to as "indirect dowry" in the sociology literature (see Goody (1978)). According to our dataset, on
average, nearly all of the cash in bride-price became indirect dowry. This suggests that the cash component in the
bride price should be included in the marital transfers enjoyed by the grooms, even though they are initially given to
the bride￿ s parents as inter-familial transfers.
24National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook (2007)
12problem. Thus, the two-step maximization is valid and all the implications of our model should
apply. The same argument does not hold for daughters, where about 20 percent of the sampled
daughters do not receive a dowry. For these cases, implications of the model￿ s corner solution have
to be derived, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Second, due to the nature of patrilocal
society and village land rules, only sons are entitled to receive household land as part of household
divisions. As a result, our investment di⁄erence multiple transfers test is only feasible for the sons
sample. Lastly, given the magnitude of the bride-price and sons￿eligibility to receive land transfers,
our measure of total inter-vivos transfers is a better measure of lifetime transfer for sons than for
daughters.
3.3 Land Division
Some families in our sample made household property divisions before the parents were deceased.
These agreements were typically verbal, with only 20 percent relying on formal written contracts.
Noteworthy, daughters in rural China are not entitled to any forms of (pre-mortem) bequests. Only
sons are potential recipients.
These pre-mortem bequests include housing, land, and other producer durable goods. 75 percent
of our households have divided the house, 65 percent of the households have divided the land, and
a few households (about 10 percent) have divided other items. The value of housing and items are
reported. For land divisions, we know the amount of the land and the time of transfer. For purposes
of valuing the inheritance associated with land, a few institutional details regarding property rights
are required.
Land in rural China is not privately owned. Rather, ownership rights reside with the village
(collective), and households are allocated usufruct rights. Since the introduction of economic reform
in the late 1970s, these rights have largely been allocated to households on a per capita basis, with
the length of tenure governed in principal by a series of land laws. For example, the ￿rst national
land law extended tenure for 15 years. The land laws have not always been respected, and land has
often been reallocated among households by villages before the expiration of the land law, however
in Hebei province, use rights have been very secure.
As part of the household division of property, sons are e⁄ectively receiving usufruct rights to
the land that has been allocated to the household by the village. At a minimum, these rights are
secure until the next land law, but in practice, the claims run much longer. Conservatively, we
calculate the value of the land as the total real return to the land from cultivation over the ￿rst 10
years after the land is given to the son.25
Panel A of Table 5 reports the summary statistics for each of the pre-mortem bequests. Notice
that the value of the housing given at the time of the marriage represents a large share of the total
value of the bequest, but these transfers have been counted as part of the bride-price. Therefore,
25We assume that the share of land in value-added is ￿fty percent. Because of discounting, increasing the number
of years does not signi￿cantly change the value of the inheritance.
13land is the only important transfer besides the marital transfers captured by our data.26;27
3.4 Sons Sample
There are 178 households with more than one married son in our dataset. Further restrictions
have to be imposed for purpose of our analysis. First of all, children with missing values for
educational expenditure or marital transfers were dropped. There are also 16 households, or less
than 10 percent, when the groom￿ s family did not pay any bride-price. We exclude them in our
analysis, as they do not represent the marriage arrangement we usually observe. We also exclude
18 matrilocal marriages,28 since this marriage pattern deviated from the typical patrilocal custom
in the region. We keep all households with more than one married son surviving the above criteria.
Altogether, 127 households with 264 sons/grooms are used in the analysis of this paper.
Table 1 presents descriptive information on the characteristics of these households and their
children. To show the relative importance of the between-sibling variation in our dataset, we
calculate for individual-level variables the within-household standard deviations in column 4. The
results are generally half of the overall standard deviations (column 3 of Table 1). Column 5 reports
the number of households with within-household variations in children￿ s characteristics.
Sons examined in this paper were born between the 1950s and the 1990s, with most marriages
occurring between 1980 and 2000. Mean age at marriage was 23. Before marriage, sons were more
likely to participate in agricultural activities than non-agricultural activities.
We consider the education of the father as an important determinant of parental wealth. In
addition, we use the total real value of housing and total value of ￿xed assets in agriculture as
proxies for family wealth. These measures are constructed based on a complete inventory of the
investments in housing and agricultural producer durables made by the parents since they were
married.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 fihrih = f ￿ r
We ￿rst estimate the model assuming homogenous marginal compensation for sibling di⁄erences
in educational expenditure, fihrih = f ￿ r. Columns (1) to (8) in Table 2 report the estimation
results for equation (8) with various children￿ s attributes as controls for kih. These attributes
include: an indicator if they are the taller of the sons in the household, indicators for having
more agricultural and non-agricultural experience in the household, an indicator if they lived with
26In fact, other than marital transfers and household divisions, we ask in our survey about every transfer larger
than 100 yuan that parents give to the children after their marriages. Only 43 sons (16 percent of total sample of
sons) receive post-marital transfers, with an average of 1700 yuan. This value is only about one third of the mean
bride-price these sons received. The evidence suggests that o⁄ering large post-marital transfers is not a common
practice in rural Chinese villages.
27We also estimate our model adding both post-marital transfers and the value of other property received as part
of household division into the measure of inter-vivos transfers. The results are not signi￿cantly changed.
28In matrilocal marriages, the newly-wed couples live with or in the same village as the bride￿ s natal family.
14parents before or after marriage, and an indicator if they were the ￿rst son.29 The "hypothetical"
son for comparison in each household has zero values in all of these dummies. In column (8), we
only select the signi￿cant factors in the full speci￿cation in order to focus our discussions. In all
tables, the estimated coe¢ cient on school expenditure is ￿, where ￿￿ is the marginal compensation
coe¢ cient.
The point estimate of ￿￿ using OLS without any other covariates in column O1 is 0.23 with a
standard error of 0.06. Since marital transfers and schooling expenditure are positively related with
household income, the estimate of ￿￿ is biased downward without controls for household income.
Column O2 adds household ￿xed e⁄ects to the regression (while maintaining k1h = k2h, i.e., the
equal concerns assumption). We obtain an estimate of ￿￿ of 0.39 with a standard error of 0.15.
Controlling for household ￿xed e⁄ects, the estimated magnitude of ￿ increases by over one third in
the direction predicted by the theory.
As we add other household and sibling interaction e⁄ects, the point estimate for ￿￿ generally
remains in the vicinity of 0.35. With a conservative expectation of r = 1, this estimate of f ￿ r
implies a seemingly low f of 0.35, i.e., children can only retain less than half of their schooling
returns. It is suspected that our results may su⁄er from downward bias. We will test and resolve
this underestimation problem of f ￿ r in the subsequent sections.
Our preferred speci￿cation is in column (8). Here, compared with the "hypothetical son" in
the household, taller sons enjoy 22 percentage more in total consumption. Sons who live with
their parents after marriage obtain nearly 40 percent more consumption than those who do not.
Last, older sons tend to receive one ￿fth less than their younger siblings, which at ￿rst sight is
inconsistent with popular wisdom about ￿rst-son bias in rural China. Below, we show that this
inconsistency is resolved with appropriate discounting.
The results also suggest that parents tend to provide more consumption to children with more
premarital agricultural or non-agricultural experience, and to children who do not live outside the
home before marriage (column (7)). Even though these coe¢ cients are imprecisely estimated, their
magnitudes suggest that they are not economically insigni￿cant.
Estimates of k0wh are summarized in Table A2. Panels A and B show the summary statistics
and distribution of k0wh estimated under alternative speci￿cations in Table 2. Both the graph
and the Kolmogorov￿ Smirnov statistics show that the distributions of k0wh are not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from log-normal. In panel C, we examine the determinants of k0wh, by regressing it against
household level characteristics. The estimates are consistent across columns. The coe¢ cients on the
number of sons and daughters in the household are negative, suggesting that the hypothetical son
enjoys less consumption if there are more sons or more girls in the family. The level of consumption
is also higher for children from families that are richer, with better educated fathers, and that are
29In an unreported speci￿cation, we try to control for year e⁄ects using sons￿(1) age at marriage and (2) age at
the time of the survey. The former￿ s coe¢ cient is -0.02 and statistically insigni￿cant. The latter carries a signi￿cant
coe¢ cient of -0.05, suggesting that one will receive 5 percent less in consumption if he is 1 year older than his brother.
As we shall see later, this result is consistent with what we obtain from the ￿rst son dummy. However, it is not wise
to put the "￿rst son indicator￿and ￿age￿in the same regression since they are highly correlated. Given that our
main conclusions are not a⁄ected in either way, we decide not to put these time controls in our ￿nal regressions.
15located in richer counties.
Our behavioral model generates a linear regression model with multiplicative family and sibling
￿xed e⁄ects rather than log linear or linear ￿xed e⁄ects regression models. In appendix D, we
present and discuss the estimation results with the traditionally used level-on-level and log-on-log
regressions. We ￿nd that functional form matters: a level-on-level speci￿cation is more appropriate
under the (restricted) ￿equal concern￿assumption, but this lacks behavioral justi￿cation in more
general cases; a log-on-log speci￿cation imposes a strong restriction in our multiple transfers test,
which is rejected by our data.
4.1.1 Sensitivity to discount rates
The framework discussed in section 2 is a static model while actual intra-household transfers are
made over time and in di⁄erent periods for di⁄erent children. To make these transfers comparable
in present value, all transfers made in each household are discounted at rate d to the year in which
the ￿rst son was married. In columns (1)-(6) of Table 4, we compare di⁄erent speci￿cations (the
basic ones assuming ￿equal concerns￿and the parsimonious ones with only the signi￿cant controls)
under di⁄erent discount rates in order to test the sensitivity of our results.
Two patterns are notable in Table 4. First, estimated coe¢ cients on schooling investments
decline in magnitude as the discount rate increases. Therefore, taking the discount rate into account
does not solve our problem of underestimating f ￿ r. Second, estimates of ￿ do not vary across
alternative discount rates either in terms of their magnitudes or standard errors, except for a time
related factor: the ￿rst son indicator. Coe¢ cients on the ￿rst son dummy consistently increase with
discount rates, and become positive eventually, suggesting that ￿rst sons receive higher consumption
than other siblings.
These patterns are due to the correction for discounting. Educational expenditures occurred
before marital transfers. If we discount everything to the time when the ￿rst son got married,30 the
di⁄erences in education expenditure across siblings by age will widen. Meanwhile, the di⁄erence
in marital transfers by age will be compressed. So discounting increases the value of schooling
expenditure of the ￿rst son and reduces the value of marital transfers to the second son. This logic
explains why the estimates of the ￿rst son e⁄ect increases with the discount rate.
4.1.2 An investment di⁄erence multiple transfers test
Parents may use transfers other than marital transfers to make up the di⁄erence in human
capital investments among their children. Proposition 5 says that when we use a part of the life-
time transfers to estimate equation (12), f ￿ r will be biased downwards. To address this issue, we
construct a more complete measure of life-time parental transfers by adding to marital transfers
other signi￿cant parental transfers captured by our survey - the value of land division - and perform
our multiple transfers test.
30Choosing a di⁄erent timing as baseline for discounting will generate the same trend.
16We re-estimate equation (12) after adding the value of land to the dependent variable (tih). The
sample size becomes smaller, because we concentrate on the sub-sample of households that have
made land divisions. The results are reported in Table 5. Consistent with proposition 5, taking
into account the value of inherited land substantially increases the absolute value of the coe¢ cients
on schooling expenditures.31 This result is robust across all discount factors. For example, with a
ten percent discount rate, our preferred speci￿cation in column 6 now suggests f ￿ r = 0:37 rather
than 0.16. That is, the estimated compensatory coe¢ cient more than doubles when we are able to
capture more of lifetime parental transfers.
Moreover, the magnitudes of the ￿s in Table 5 become smaller but with similar standard errors
as before. Overall, they become statistically insigni￿cant. However, their signs are the same and
the patterns under alternative discount rates remain as in Table 4.32
To obtain con￿dence intervals for our multiple transfers test, we bootstrap our sample with
100 iterations and store the estimates of the marginal compensation coe¢ cients (￿tg) with the
value of the bride price (tg = t1) and the value of the bride price plus land division (tg = t3) as
the dependent variable. Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the ratio ￿t3=￿t1 of these 100
iterations. Across alternative speci￿cations and discounting rates, the mean value of the ratio is
greater than 1. In addition, ￿t3=￿t1 > 1 occurs with more than 95 percent chance. The evidence
suggests that we cannot reject the hypothesis that "adding in more parental transfers increases the
magnitude of marginal compensation coe¢ cients" at conventional signi￿cance level.
Our theoretical model predicts that estimating equation (8) using a partial measure of parental
transfer will underestimate f ￿ r. Comparison between Table 4 and 5, along with the bootstrap
results in Table 6 shows that this concern is empirically signi￿cant.
To sum up section 4.1, two ￿ndings particularly stand out. First, controlling for unobserved
household heterogeneity is important. Second, a fuller accounting of lifetime parental transfers
signi￿cantly increases the estimate of the compensatory e⁄ect, consistent with the unitary model.
4.2 fihrih 6= f ￿ r
Relaxing the homogenous marginal compensation e⁄ect, we expect fihrih to depend on sons￿
activities and living arrangements with the parents. These patterns can be tested by examining
the interaction terms between schooling expenditure and the children￿ s attributes in equation (12).
We present in Table A1 the expected signs of the interaction terms. The main occupation of the
parents in our sample is farming. Parents will bene￿t more from their sons￿education when their
sons participate in agricultural activities or live with them after marriage. Therefore, we expect
the interaction term to be positive for these sons (lower fih ￿ rih). Note that children with more
agricultural experience have lower fih ￿ rih not only because of the lower fih, but also because of
31Even though the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant at times due to the larger standard errors.
32The di⁄erence we observe may due to the fact that we are using a more restricted sample. To address this
concern, we replicate marital transfer regressions in Table 4 using the same sub-sample as Table 5. The results are
shown in Table A3. The coe¢ cients on schooling expenditures and parental bias factors in this table are very similar
with those in Table 4, suggesting that the increase in estimates of f ￿r in Table 5 cannot be attributed to the sample
selection.
17their lower rih. i.e., returns to schooling are lower in agriculture than non-agriculture. Following
the same logic, we expect sons with more agricultural experience or live independently to have
higher fih ￿rih, therefore negative interaction terms. Traditionally, the ￿rst son usually takes more
responsibility for caring for their parents and siblings. They are expected to have lower fih ￿ rih.
We do not have a prior on the interaction between height and schooling.
Table 3 reports the results. For each speci￿cation in columns (1) to (8), we interact the same
attributes with schooling investments as used to control for the parental bias.33 The ￿rst thing to
notice is that our estimates of ￿s in equation (12) are very imprecise. The large standard errors are
mainly due to our relatively small sample size. Second, because of the weak explanatory power of
the interaction terms,34 adding them into the regressions does not signi￿cantly alter our estimates
of ￿ and ￿s (comparing Table 3 with Table 2).
While imprecisely estimated, most coe¢ cients for the interaction terms in Table 3 have the pre-
dicted signs (as Table A1). In column 7, sons living with parents before marriage or after marriage
retain less income from schooling investments. The ￿rst sons are also found to directly bene￿t less
from schooling than their siblings. By contrast, sons with more non-agriculture experience tend
to receive 0.17 yuan more from each yuan spent on schooling, consistent with the view that their
parents as farmers are less likely to bene￿t directly from them. On the other hand, sons with more
agricultural experience retain more of their schooling returns which is anomalous. Finally, taller
sons bene￿t more from schooling.
The last three columns in Table 4 show that our main conclusions are robust to di⁄erent
discounting rates. Columns 7-9 in Table 5 show that including the value of land division parental
transfers does not change the point estimates of ￿s substantially from that in Table 4.
In summary, we ￿nd evidence suggesting that fihrih 6= f ￿ r. However the large standard
errors preclude us from being able to make precise quantitative statements on this heterogeneity in
marginal compensation.
5 Other Issues
5.1 Measurement error in schooling investments
The low absolute value of the estimated marginal compensation coe¢ cients may be due to
attenuation bias. Given that our education expenditure variable mainly comes from recall data,
measurement error might exist, which could bias estimates of ￿￿ towards zero. One way to correct
for this bias is to adopt an instrumental variable approach. "Years of schooling" is an ideal candidate
to serve as an instrument for education expenditure: (1) it is positively correlated with education
expenditure and (2) its measurement error, if there is any, is not likely to be correlated with that
of education expenditure.
33We also try speci￿cations where all of the attributes are interacted with the schooling investments regardless of
the way we control for kih. The conclusions are essentially the same.
34Notice that Table 2 and 3 have the same R
2 for all speci￿cations.
18In Panel A of table 7, we replicate all speci￿cations in Table 4 with 2SLS estimation. The ￿rst
stage regressions and reduced form regressions are presented in Panel B and Panel C, respectively.
As expected, "years of schooling" is a good predictor of education expenditure in the ￿rst stage.
(One year of schooling costs about 800 yuan on average.) In the second stage, estimates of ￿s and
￿s do not change much. However, the precision of f ￿r is lost due to the increased standard errors.
Compared with the OLS results, the IV estimates are slightly smaller, but the Hausman tests cannot
reject that their di⁄erence is statistically insigni￿cant. We conclude that the underestimation of
f ￿ r is not likely due to the attenuation bias.35
5.2 Strategic behavior of the children
So far, our framework assumes children are passive and only parents make decisions in the
family. Full compensation in transfers amounts to full insurance for children. If the returns to
education depend on children￿ s e⁄orts, two problems emerge: free riding (among siblings) and
moral hazard. Both of them cause the children to exert less e⁄ort than optimal. To avoid these
problems, parents would break the linkage between education achievement and inter-vivos transfers
and commit an equal amount of transfers to their children. Such strategic behaviors tend to drive
the coe¢ cient on education investment towards zero in our regression. Thus one interpretation of
our results is that strategic concerns are second order in our families under study.
5.3 Public goods in transfers
The externality to the parents and other family members may not only exist in individual￿ s
schooling investment, but also in the transfers. For example, when a son lives with parents after
marriage, his parents may enjoy the transfer made to this son at the time of marriage as well,
such as a new TV or a new house. However, it should be emphasized that the ￿rst order condition
determining the optimal schooling is not distorted. As long as MR(sih) = MC(sih) holds, schooling
investments are e¢ cient, and family income is maximized at w￿
h(s￿
ih). Suppose that parents own
expenditure is ch, and they also bene￿t a proportion of bih from the transfer to the children tih.
The consumption of the parents and children are
c￿




ih) + tih = kihw￿
h
where i = 1;2. Notice that for given s￿
ih, the ￿nal consumption enjoyed by the parents, c￿
h +
b1ht1h + b2ht2h, is the same regardless of the value of bih. In other words, when bihtih increases,
either because the parents live with the child (higher bih) or the child requires a larger transfer to
35Table A7 reports the reduced form results of this excercise, suggesting that an additional year of schooling only
contributes an increase of 120 yuan in life-time consumption (see preferred speci￿cation with discounting rate 0.05),
which is much lower than the monetary cost suggested by the ￿rst stage results. It is not surprising that such a
low estimate in the marginal return to schooling is consistent with our low point estimates of the marginal return to
schooling expenditure in Table 4.
19obtain the desired consumption level (higher tih), parents will decrease their own expenditure c￿
h
accordingly, so that their consumption is not changed.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines how parents adjust bride-prices and land divisions to compensate their
sons for di⁄erences in their schooling expenditures in rural China. The main estimate implies
that when a son receives one yuan less in schooling investment than his brother, he will obtain
0.7 yuan more in observable marital and post-marital transfers as partial compensation. This
marginal compensation estimate is quantitatively larger than any comparable estimate using North
American data, suggesting that the unitary model is a useful model of resource allocation for sons
in traditional agricultural families. Controlling for unobserved household heterogeneity, planned
consumption di⁄erences across sons, and a fuller accounting of lifetime transfers are quantitatively
important.
There are a number of avenues for future research. First, the discrepancies between within
gender and across gender tests of the unitary model in China need further study. In our data,
we will have to deal with the failure of two stage optimization for daughters because a signi￿cant
number of daughters receive zero dowry. Second, it will be useful to consider strategic models of
family interaction when fih < 1 and there is a con￿ ict between the household￿ s investment optimum
and the individual￿ s optimum. Finally, we have ignored the question of young adults leaving their
villages and moving to cities. Since this trend will grow, it is important to extend the framework
to incorporate this phenomenon.
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22Appendix
A Estimation of the Multiplicative Model
Given a random sample of households h = 1;::;H, each with 2 children i = 1;2, consider the
regression
yih = (1 + Dih￿) ￿ !h + Xihb + "ih (16)
where yih is the dependent variable; Dih and Xih are vectors of children￿ s characteristics; and !h
is the household ￿xed e⁄ect. The parameters to be identi￿ed are ￿ = (￿;f!hgH
h=1;b).36







[yih ￿ (1 + Dih￿) ￿ Wh ￿ Xihb]
2
To reduce the computational burden of a global search for all parameters, we take advantage of the
partial linearity in (16): given a value of ￿, ￿0, equation (16) is a linear model. f!hgH
h=1 and b can be
estimated through OLS. Denoting these estimators as f!ols
h (￿0jXih;Dih)gH
h=1 and bols(￿0jXih;Dih),
our problem is to ￿nd






(yih ￿ (1 + Dih￿0) ￿ !ols
h (￿0jXih;Dih) ￿ Xihbols(￿0jXih;Dih))2
Given b ￿, the ￿nal estimator b ￿ is
b ￿ = (b ￿;f!ols
h (b ￿jXih;Dih)gH
h=1;bols(b ￿jXih;Dih))
B The Incidental Parameter Problem
The least square estimators outlined above are subjected to a so-called "incidental parameter"
problem. As ￿rst noticed by Neyman and Scott (1948), standard estimators of nonlinear panel
data model are usually inconsistent if the length of the panel is small relative to the number of
observations. In this case, the ￿nite sample bias in the ￿xed e⁄ects parameters (f!hgH
h=1 in our
context) will contaminate estimates of other parameters (￿ and b in (16)).
Given the partial nonlinearity feature of our model, an alternative approach that can help get










36In our context, comparing (16) and (12), we can see the following correspondence: yih = tih, !h = k0wh,
Xih = (sih;Dihsih), and b = (￿;￿).
23and then take the sibling di⁄erence within the same household
￿
y
1 + D￿ h
= ￿
X
1 + D￿ h










1+D2h￿. Notice that household ￿xed e⁄ects
are eliminated in (17). The parameters to be determined are (￿;b), which can be consistently
estimated through NLS.37
In order to compare the accuracy and e¢ ciency between our least-square estimate and the above
quasi-di⁄erencing estimate, we conduct Monte Carlo experiments. The number of households is
127, consistent with our dataset. In each simulation, each household is endowed with a k0wh
assumed to be log normal distributed. Its distribution parameters are calibrated from the moments
of the household ￿xed e⁄ects f!hgH
h=1 that we estimate from the data.
Each household has two children, one of whom is the "￿rst son". We randomly generate two
other attributes of the children, "indicator of the taller son" (Dtaller
ih ) and "indicator of living with
parents post marriage" (D
livep
ih ), such that their variance-covariance matrices with the ￿rst son
indicator (D1stson
ih ) replicate the ones in the real data.
We regress schooling expenditure on k0wh and children￿ s attributes using the actual dataset.
We then use the coe¢ cients and the distribution parameters of the error terms to generate the
simulated schooling investments. Note that the error terms here serve as the ability endowments of
the children. The inter-vivos transfers are simulated using equation (8) with error terms randomly





ih g. We estimate the model




ih ) ￿ !h + ￿sih + "ih
with the "true" parameters being set as (￿;￿1;￿2;￿3) = (￿0:3;0:2;0:4;￿0:2). Note that we allow
cov(sih;!h) > 0 and cov(sih;Dih) > 0, but keep cov(sih;"ih) = 0 in the simulated data, which are
basic identi￿cation assumptions maintained throughout our paper.
Table A4 reports the results of 500 simulations. Panel A contains our least square results and
panel B contains the quasi-di⁄erencing results. The coe¢ cients are the mean value of the 500
simulated estimates. In the brackets are their corresponding standard errors. The null hypothesis
being tested is that "the mean of the estimates has the same value as the true parameters".
With di⁄erent speci￿cations, the least square approach used in our paper delivers highly precise
estimates. By contrast, the quasi-di⁄erencing results exhibit larger bias and larger standard errors,
especially when all three attributes of the children are controlled for simultaneously. We conclude
that, even though our least square estimates may be theoretically inconsistent, their ￿nite sample
bias is negligible and they are more e¢ cient than the consistent quasi-di⁄erencing estimates.38 We
37For consistency we need cov(￿
X
1+D￿ h;￿h) = 0 in (17). This condition is ensured under our assumptions in the
model.
38This conclusion is similar to Greene (2004). Using Monte Carlo methods, he ￿nds that the coe¢ cients in the
Tobit model with ￿xed e⁄ects are "una⁄ected" by the incidental parameter problem. He observes that the estimators￿
24therefore base our inferences on the least squared results in our paper.
C Robustness of investment di⁄erence multiple transfers test to
the biases in the transfer regression
This section provides an example of how our investment di⁄erence multiple transfers test is
immune to the potential bias in the transfer regression. Consider the case where we regress marital
transfer on a child￿ s educational expenditure without household or sibling ￿xed e⁄ects, as discussed
in proposition 2. The transfer equations can be written as
tih;g = ￿g￿ ￿ ￿gf ￿ rsih + ￿g￿ih + ￿ih;g, g = 1;2;3, ￿3 = ￿1 + ￿2
where ￿ = kihwh = (
H P
h=1
(k1h + k2h)wh)(2H)￿1 and ￿ih = kihwh ￿ kihwh. It is easy to show that
￿plimc ￿tg = ￿g(f ￿ r ￿
Cov(sih;￿ih)
V ar(sih)







> 1, g = 1;2
which is independent of the bias term.
D Regressions where sibling e⁄ects and household ￿xed e⁄ects
enter linearly
In this section we present the results and discuss the limitations of the commonly-used regression
with linear household and sibling ￿xed e⁄ects. We regress the bride-price on schooling investments
using both level-on-level form (Table A5) and log-on-log form (Table A6), with (panel As) and
without household ￿xed e⁄ects (panel Bs).39 Di⁄erent children characteristics are controlled in
di⁄erent columns.
Controlling for household level heterogeneities is important. Without household ￿xed e⁄ects,
the coe¢ cients on schooling investments are signi￿cantly negative in level regressions but insignif-
icant (sometimes even positive) in log form regressions. After adding in household dummies, the
coe¢ cients become substantially smaller (more negative) and signi￿cant throughout all speci￿ca-
tions, indicating larger compensation e⁄ects in bride-prices. Children from richer families tend to
behavior in models with a continuous dependent variable (whether truncated or not) are quite di⁄erent from binary
choice models.
39Family level attributes, such as father￿ s years of schooling, total number of sons and daughters, and wealth
indicators are also controlled for in the regression without household ￿xed e⁄ects. These coe¢ cients are not reported
to save space.
25receive more in both education investments and inter-vivos transfers, therefore simple OLS regres-
sion will result in an upward bias in the coe¢ cients on schooling investments if we cannot perfectly
control for family wealth. For this reason, we just focus our discussions on household ￿xed e⁄ect
regressions.
Our level-on-level ￿xed e⁄ect regressions suggest that when one son receives 1 yuan less in his
schooling investments than his brothers, he will be compensated by about 0.30 to 0.38 yuan in his
marital transfers. The log form regressions support a similar compensation story.
Children￿ s characteristics are generally not signi￿cant in ￿xed e⁄ect regressions. However, some
of the indicators have relatively large coe¢ cients in magnitude. For example, sons living with their
parents after marriage receive over 1000 yuan more than their brothers in marital transfers, but
the larger standard error of this estimate precludes us from drawing any inference at conventional
con￿dence levels.
The level-on-level speci￿cation is problematic when parents have "unequal concern" towards
their children. For example, if parents love their ￿rst son 10 percent more than the others, they
will give him 10 percent, rather than 0.1 yuan, more in marital transfers. In this sense, one might
consider the log-on-log form as a better approximation to the transfer decision model. However,
the log-on-log speci￿cation imposes a strong implication in the multiple transfers test. To see this,
consider the life-time transfer determination equation
lntih = ln!h ￿ elnsih + "ih
where e is the marginal compensation elasticity. Now suppose we only observe ￿tih instead of tih,
the above equation becomes
ln￿tih = ln￿ + ln!h ￿ elnsih + "ih
The e⁄ect of ￿ is buried in the constant term and has no impact on the estimation of e. That is to
say, the log-on-log speci￿cation is robust to the problem of "partially observable life-time transfer".
Adding more transfers into the dependent variable should not change the coe¢ cient on the log of
schooling expenditure.
Table A8 tests this implication by replicating the panel B of Table A6 while adding the value
of land to the dependent variable. Compared with Table A6, estimates of e nearly double through-
out the speci￿cations in Table A8, providing strong evidence for rejecting the use of a log-on-log
speci￿cation in the transfer regressions.
26Figure 1. Surveyed Counties in Hebei 









The three surveyed counties have been shaded in. The large white area in the middle of the province 












































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
year
Edu.exp. of sons Bride-price Annual HH inc.
 
Data Sources: 
Annual household income: Hebei Bureau of Statistics (http://www.hetj.gov.cn/); 
Marital transfers and educational expenditure: Survey on family and marriage 
dynamics in Hebei province. 
 
Notes: 
We first calculate the mean marital transfers (bride-price) and educational expenditure for 
children married in each year, then smooth the graph by calculating the moving average 
of the four adjacent years. All monetary values have been deflated to the 1980 price level.   






































































Years of schooling of sons
 
Data Sources: 
Annual household income: Hebei Bureau of Statistics (http://www.hetj.gov.cn/); 
Educational expenditure and years of schooling: Survey on family and marriage 
dynamics in Hebei province. 
 
Notes: 
This graph plots the mean educational expenditure and the mean years of schooling of 
sons married in certain years.   
The graph has been smoothed using the moving average of the four adjacent years. All 




29Variable Name Unit Definition or Notes Obs Mean Std Std w/i HH
# of HH w/
intra-HH
variations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Key Variables
yr_sch year Years of schooling. 264 8.42 (2.90) (1.62) 127
edu_exp yuan
† Total educational expenditure. 264 1556 (2785) (1917) 127
mar_trans yuan Total monetory value of bride-price, including house, items and cash. 264 5085 (5151) (2469) 127
land yuan Value of the land division.
‡ 172 2328 (2007) (946) 83
Sons' Attributes
age Age. 264 33.87 (5.68) (2.83) 127
age_mar Age at marriage. 264 23.34 (2.53) (1.64) 105
taller Indicator of the taller son.* 264 0.39 (0.49) (0.44) 99
more_ag_expr Indicator of the son with more years of experience in agriculture.* 264 0.29 (0.46) (0.38) 72
more_nonag_expr Indicator of the son with more years of experience in nonagriculture.* 264 0.34 (0.47) (0.42) 88
live_in_pre Indicator of living with parents before marriage. 264 0.37 (0.48) (0.28) 40
live_in_post Indicator of living with parents afrer marriage. 264 0.38 (0.49) (0.30) 46
1st_son Indicator of the first born son. 264 0.48 (0.50) (0.50) 126
Variables used to construct the dummy variables in sons' attrinbutes
height cm Height. 264 170.34 (5.80) (2.82) 99
ag_expr year Agricultural experience before marriage. 264 3.60 (4.60) (2.26) 72
nonag_expr year Non-agricultural experience before marriage. 264 2.91 (3.04) (1.60) 88
Household Attributes
yr_sch_fa year Father's years of schooling. 127 5.32 (3.11)
n_sons Total number of sons in the household. 127 2.42 (0.76)
n_daughters Total number of daughters in the household. 127 0.76 (0.82)
ttl_house yuan Total value of houses ever built by the parents. 127 11659 (12311)
ttl_ag_equip yuan Total value of agricultural equipment ever possessed by the parents. 127 2224 (5085)
fengrun Indicator of residents in Fengrun county. 127 0.35 (0.48)
zhaoxian Indicator of residents in Zhaoxian county. 127 0.29 (0.45)
chicheng Indicator of residents in Chicheng county. 127 0.37 (0.48)
Note:
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
† All monetary values are deflated to the 1980 price level.
‡ The Hebei Statistiscal Yearbook provides the net income from cultivation per mu in each year. We assume that half this income is the net
return to land. Given the area of the land recieved by each son, the value of the land is defined as the sum of the total return to land over the 10
years since the land was given by the parents.
* Comparison among the selected sibling in the household.
30OLS HH FE
O1 O2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
edu_exp (β) -0.23 -0.39 -0.40 -0.36 -0.38 -0.31 -0.29 -0.35 -0.20 -0.25
[0.06]***[0.15]***[0.15]*** [0.15]** [0.16]** [0.17]* [0.13]** [0.14]** [0.11]* [0.12]**
δ








live_in_post 0.40 0.45 0.40
[0.25] [0.16]*** [0.17]**
1st_son -0.20 -0.23 -0.22
[0.13] [0.12]** [0.12]*




The regressions are based on the sons' sample with 264 observations in 127 households. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† P value of the F test for the joint significance of kih.
Table 2. Multiplicative Specification
Multiplicative FE
31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
edu_exp (β) -0.37 -0.36 -0.33 -0.32 -0.29 -0.44 -0.18 -0.29
[0.19]* [0.15]** [0.17]* [0.13]** [0.12]** [0.28] [0.22] [0.2]
δ








live_in_post 0.39 0.43 0.40
[0.17]** [0.21]** [0.12]***
1st_son -0.22 -0.24 -0.26
[0.1]** [0.12]** [0.08]***
γ: Interaction with educational expenditure (edu_exp)








live_in_post 0.10 0.15 0.12
[0.57] [0.59] [0.51]
1st_son 0.12 0.05 0.14
[0.28] [0.19] [0.21]




The regressions are based on the sons' sample with 264 observations in 127 households. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† P value of the F test for the joint significance of kih.
‡ P value of the F test for the joint significance of the interaction terms. 
Table 3. Multiplicative Specification with Interaction Effects 
32d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
edu_exp (β) -0.40 -0.26 -0.14 -0.25 -0.21 -0.16 -0.29 -0.16 -0.06
[0.15]*** [0.12]** [0.1] [0.12]** [0.1]** [0.1] [0.2] [0.18] [0.17]
δ
taller 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.25
[0.11]** [0.11]** [0.11]* [0.08]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]***
live_in_post 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.34
[0.17]** [0.18]** [0.18]** [0.12]*** [0.08]*** [0.08]***
1st_son -0.22 0.11 0.47 -0.26 0.13 0.64
[0.12]* [0.11] [0.12]*** [0.08]*** [0.07]* [0.07]***
γ: Interaction with educational expenditure (edu_exp)
taller -0.16 -0.02 0.00
[0.17] [0.16] [0.16]
live_in_post 0.12 0.07 0.07
[0.51] [0.32] [0.26]
1st_son 0.14 -0.04 -0.17
[0.21] [0.18] [0.15]
R-squared 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84
F-test1† 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
F-test2‡ 0.71 0.97 0.38
Note: 
The regressions are based on the sons' sample with 264 observations in 127 households. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† P value of the F test for the joint significance of kih.  
‡ P value of the F test for the joint significance of the interaction terms. 
Table 4. Multiplicative Specification with Discounting








Panel B. Regression Results
d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1
edu_exp (β) -0.69 -0.50 -0.32 -0.54 -0.44 -0.37 -0.75 -0.55 -0.36
[0.2]*** [0.19]*** [0.17]* [0.19]*** [0.2]** [0.2]* [0.18]*** [0.17]*** [0.17]**
δ
taller 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.10
[0.08] [0.09] [0.1] [0.08] [0.07] [0.08]
live_in_post 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.12
[0.14] [0.16] [0.18] [0.11] [0.09] [0.09]
1st_son -0.19 0.01 0.25 -0.23 -0.05 0.23
[0.1]* [0.11] [0.12]** [0.08]*** [0.08] [0.09]***
γ: Interaction with educational expenditure (edu_exp)
taller -0.01 -0.11 -0.18
[0.3] [0.26] [0.26]
live_in_post 1.33 0.74 0.43
[0.96] [0.68] [0.59]
1st_son 0.28 0.17 0.02
[0.29] [0.27] [0.23]
R-squared 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88
F-test1† 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.01 0.86 0.32
F-test2‡ 0.22 0.36 0.47
Note: 
The regressions are based on sons sample with land divisions (172 observations in 83 households). 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† P value of the F test for the joint significance of kih.  
‡ P value of the F test for the joint significance of the interaction terms. 
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Basic Preferred Specification with Interactions
Table 5. Adding Pre-mortem Bequests as Parts of the Transfers
12
† Construction of the value of land: The Hebei Statistiscal
Yearbook provides the net income from cultivation per mu in
each year. We assume that half this income is the net return to
land. Given the area of the land recieved by each son, the value
of the land is defined as the sum of the total return to land over
the 10 years since the land was given by the parents.
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Pre-mortem Bequest
# Household making





34mean std min max P(βt3/βt1>1)
d=0 (1) 1.76 0.68 1.09 5.97 1.00
d=0.05 (2) 1.47 0.60 1.05 6.00 1.00
d=0.1 (3) 1.29 1.09 -3.77 9.77 0.94
d=0 (4) 2.27 1.76 -6.03 12.37 0.97
d=0.05 (5) 1.22 7.10 -67.00 16.64 0.99
d=0.1 (6) 1.42 0.81 -2.59 6.11 0.98
Note:
Each row reports the results of a corresponding specification of Table 4. 




This table reports the summary statistics of the ratio of coefficients on schooling investment
(β) in regressions with the bride-price as the dependent variable (t1) and the bride-price plus
land division (t3) as the dependent variable. The number of bootstrap iterations is 100.
35Panel A:
d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
edu_exp (β) -0.35 -0.24 -0.16 -0.20 -0.19 -0.14 -0.21 -0.12 -0.04
[0.26] [0.17] [0.13] [0.21] [0.17] [0.14] [0.25] [0.21] [0.18]
δ
taller 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.28
[0.11]** [0.11]* [0.12]* [0.09]*** [0.07]*** [0.07]***
live_in_post 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.36
[0.18]** [0.18]** [0.19]* [0.13]*** [0.1]*** [0.09]***
1st_son -0.22 0.11 0.47 -0.28 0.09 0.64
[0.12]* [0.12] [0.12]*** [0.09]*** [0.08] [0.09]***
γ: Interaction with educational expenditure (edu_exp)
taller -0.24 -0.11 -0.07
[0.22] [0.18] [0.16]
live_in_post 0.58 0.30 0.10
[0.42] [0.33] [0.25]
1st_son 0.19 0.00 -0.17
[0.22] [0.19] [0.19]
R-squared 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84
F-test1† 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
F-test2‡ 0.93 1.00 0.64
Panel B: 1st Stage
yr_sch 769.24 883.35 1044.11 755.48 839.61 955.74 755.48 839.61 955.74
[178.6]***[232.84]*** [307.54]***[165.72]*** [215.65]*** [284.44]***[165.72]*** [215.65]*** [284.44]***
R-squared 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.76 0.74 0.73
Panel C: Reduced Form
d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
yr_sch -208.52 -183.42 -153.10 -63.02 -126.16 -95.79 -149.26 -104.26 -75.70
[206.33] [151.01] [138.97] [137.37] [147.66] [131.88] [176.26] [144.88] [130.6]
R-squared 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84
Note: 
The regressions are based on the sons' sample with 264 observations in 127 households. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† P value of the F test for the joint significance of kih.  
‡ P value of the F test for the joint significance of the interaction terms. 
Basic Preferred Specification with Interactions
Table 7. Instrumenting Educational Expenditure by Years of Schooling




appropriated by the son
Sign of the interaction
effects with schooling
expenditure







Live outside the home before
marriage
more -
Live with the parents after
marriage
less +
First son less +
Table A1. Predictions on the Interaction Terms
37Table A2. Estimates of the consumption level enjoyed by the hypothetical son 0 in each household (k0wh) 
 
Panel A. Summary of k0wh estimated from specifications in Table 2      Panel B. Histogram and kernel density of k0wh 
 
Spec  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Log-normality 
Test 
(1)  127  5458    4360    0.21   
(2)  127  5574    4480    0.08   
(3)  127  5542    4402    0.16   
(4)  127  4833    3956    0.24   
(5)  127  4775    3818    0.26   
(6)  127  6303    5017    0.19   
(7)  127  3957    3294    0.19   
(8)  127  4787    3877    0.14   
Note: The “log-normality test” column reports the p-value of the   
Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution test with the null hypothesis “the log of k0wh follows a 
normal distribution”. 
 
Panel C. Regressions of k0wh on household level characteristics 
 
Dependent variable: 
estimates of k0wh 
Specifications in Table 2 used to estimate k0wh 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
n_sons  -665.2    -739.8    -690.3  -784.7    -616.9  -840.3    -629.0  -643.5 
  [329.4]**  [340.0]**  [339.5]** [295.7]*** [307.3]** [383.9]**  [256.3]** [312.0]**
n_daughters  -707.9    -790.4    -710.8  -724.2    -591.5  -779.0    -454.8  -517.0 
  [400.0]*  [393.7]**  [403.1]* [337.9]** [315.1]* [466.5]*  [263.9]* [325.2] 
yr_sch_fa  34.1    18.3    29.5    -8.9    8.6    24.7    -5.5    11.0   
  [92.4]  [94.1]  [93.2]  [86.6]  [80.3]  [108.1]  [69.8]  [81.0] 
ttl_house  0.1    0.1    0.1    0.1    0.1    0.2    0.1    0.1   
  [0.1]***  [0.1]**  [0.1]**  [0.0]***  [0.0]**  [0.1]**  [0.0]**  [0.0]** 
ttl_ag_equip  0.3    0.3    0.2    0.3    0.2    0.3    0.2    0.3   
  [0.1]***  [0.1]***  [0.1]*** [0.1]***  [0.1]*** [0.1]***  [0.1]*** [0.1]***
fengrun  427.0    512.8    479.1    418.5    543.3    669.4    482.1    576.3   
  [932.1]  [960.3]  [959.9]  [809.5]  [825.5]  [1,047.3]  [664.1]  [803.8] 
chicheng  -1071.5    -1103.7    -1116.9  -589.7    -582.4  -1187.1    -369.0  -590.9 
    [875.9]  [903.6]  [903.4]  [782.7]  [773.1]  [1,010.1]  [641.5]  [762.7] 
Obs  127    127    127    127    127    127    127    127   
R-squared  0.38    0.38    0.36    0.38    0.33    0.37    0.36    0.36   
 
Note: 
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in brackets. 
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k0wh
Specification in column (8)
38d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1
edu_exp (β) -0.43 -0.37 -0.27 -0.27 -0.30 -0.29 -0.54 -0.45 -0.30
[0.22]** [0.19]* [0.16] [0.18] [0.19] [0.19] [0.25]** [0.2]** [0.19]
δ
taller 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.11
[0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.1]
live_in_post 0.25 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.15
[0.2] [0.2] [0.19] [0.1]* [0.09] [0.1]
1st_son -0.31 -0.04 0.25 -0.37 -0.11 0.23
[0.14]** [0.13] [0.13]* [0.09]*** [0.09] [0.1]**
γ: Interaction with educational expenditure (edu_exp)
taller -0.03 -0.04 -0.12
[0.29] [0.27] [0.26]
live_in_post 0.93 0.46 0.32
[0.77] [0.6] [0.55]
1st_son 0.37 0.21 0.03
[0.3] [0.26] [0.23]
R-squared 0.82 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
F-test1† 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.00 0.52 0.38
F-test2‡ 0.19 0.50 0.64
Note: 
The regressions are based on sons sample with land divisions (172 observations in 83 households). 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† P value of the F test for the joint significance of kih.  
‡ P value of the F test for the joint significance of the interaction terms. 
Table A3. Multiplicative Specification Using Housholds with Land Division
39True Value
β -0.30 -0.29 -0.30 -0.30 -0.30
[0.099] [0.096] [0.104] [0.106]
δ
height 0.2 0.20 0.20
[0.047] [0.05]
live_in_post 0.4 0.40 0.40
[0.063] [0.076]
1st_son -0.2 -0.20 -0.20
[0.034] [0.035]
True Value
β -0.30 -0.28 -0.28 -0.31 -0.24
[0.104] [0.103] [0.103] [0.158]
δ
height 0.2 0.27 0.39
[0.056] [0.666]
live_in_post 0.4 0.51 0.71
[0.097] [0.911]
1st_son -0.2 -0.10 -0.03
[0.046]** [0.349]
Note: 
Reported in the tables are the mean and standard deviation (in bracket) of the 
500 simulations. The null hypothesis being tested is H0: estimated value = true value.
** means that the null can be rejected at 5 percent significance level.
Estimated Value
Panel A. Non-linear Least Square
Panel B. Quasi-differencing
Table A4. Sensitivity of Estimate of Beta to Use of Different Estimators
Estimated Value
40Panel A: Without Household Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
edu_exp -0.30 -0.30 -0.28 -0.29 -0.25 -0.25 -0.30 -0.20













R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.36
Panel B: With Household Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
edu_exp -0.38 -0.38 -0.37 -0.37 -0.35 -0.32 -0.38 -0.30













R-squared 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.81
Note: 
The regressions are based on the sons' sample with 264 observations in 127 households. 
In panel A, family level attributes, including father's years of schooling, total number of sons and daughters, 
and wealth indicators are controlled for, but their coefficients are not reported to save space. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A5. Marital Transfers Regression (bride-price as the dependent varaible)
41Panel A: Without Household Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(edu_exp) -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.05













R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.38
Panel B: With Household Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(edu_exp) -0.30 -0.30 -0.31 -0.30 -0.28 -0.27 -0.31 -0.28













R-squared 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76
Note: 
The regressions are based on the sons' sample with 264 observations in 127 households. 
In panel A, family level attributes, including father's years of schooling, total number of sons and daughters, 
and wealth indicators are controlled for, but their coefficients are not reported to save space. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A6. Marital Transfers Regression (log(bride-price) as the dependent varaible)
42d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1 d=0 d=0.05 d=0.1
yr_sch -208.52 -183.42 -153.10 -63.02 -126.16 -95.79 -149.26 -104.26 -75.70
[206.33] [151.01] [138.97] [137.37] [147.66] [131.88] [176.26] [144.88] [130.6]
δ
taller 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.39 0.41 0.44
[0.1] [0.11] [0.14] [0.11]* [0.11]** [0.12]* [0.12]*** [0.1]*** [0.1]***
live_in_post 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.61 0.56 0.44
[0.17]** [0.18]** [0.18]** [0.17]*** [0.14]*** [0.11]***
1st_son -0.22 0.11 0.47 -0.39 0.04 0.65
[0.12]* [0.11] [0.13]*** [0.11]*** [0.1] [0.1]***
γ
taller -180.63 -149.36 -141.89
[126.67] [92] [75.08]*
live_in_post -150.15 -66.82 13.56
[160.45] [167.69] [151.92]
1st_son 155.85 23.05 -111.22
[115.46] [88.46] [122.39]
R-squared 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84
F-test1† 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
F-test2‡ 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: 
The regressions are based on the sons' sample with 264 observations in 127 households. 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† P value of the F test for the joint significance of kih.  
‡ P value of the F test for the joint significance of the interaction terms. 
Tabke A7. Reduced Form Regression - Expenditure Replaced by Years of Schooling
43(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(edu_exp) -0.54 -0.55 -0.49 -0.53 -0.50 -0.49 -0.56 -0.44













R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.73 0.77
Note: 
The regressions are based on sons sample with land divisions (172 observations in 83 households). 
Robust standard errors are in brackets, clustered at the household level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A8. Adding the Value of Land to Parental Transfers (log-log specifications with household fixed effects)
44